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The immeasurable impact of Pascal is rarely appreciated or understood by contemporary 
thinkers. On the one hand, Pascal is lauded by literary critics for his writing style while his 
philosophical contributions are overlooked. On the other hand, Pascal is trivialized by analytic 
philosophers who view his wager argument as but a poor instance of decision theory. Nicholas 
Reseller's book is distinctive in that it takes Pascal seriously as a philosopher in light of past and 
present theological modes of argumentation. As a distinguished historian of pragmatic philosophy, 
Rescher understands Pascal to be the great innovator of the major philosophical trends of our day: 
the theological use of practical reason, the diversity of modes of rationality, and the focus on praxis 
in contemporary hermeneutics. 
Reseller's fundamental thesis is that Pascal promotes a basic shift in theological 
argumentation—a shift from theoretical proof and demonstration of facts concerning God to 
practical justification of trust and hope (i.e. faith) in God. For Pascal, theological arguments are less 
like validating scientific data and more like legitimating a practice. As Rescher notes, this shift was 
guided by the "shrewd psychological insight that despair brings no benefits and hope exacts few 
penalties." Rescher persuasively shows how Pascal's wager argument presupposes a skepticism 
regarding the capacity of evidential modes of rationality to arrive at convincing theological 
conclusions. Yet, this skepticism does not lead to an irrationalism or a crude pitting of reason against 
blind faith. Rather, Pascal's mitigated skepticism—harkening back to the praxis-oriented thinkers of 
the Middle Academy and prefiguring the thought of Kant and James—invokes prudential modes of 
rationality to motivate decisions regarding theological options for actual human beings. In short, 
there may be rational grounds to believe in God, yet these grounds are practical ones that may 
engender faith in a particular God of a specific religious tradition. And over against Jules Lachelier 
and William James, for Pascal, these grounds have to do with what one will gain in the world to 
come (eternal life) as opposed to this world (empowerment and sense of dignity). 
Rescher's sophisticated treatment of Pascal is significant in that he historicizes Pascal's 
thought without rendering Pascal a vulgar historicist. That is, he acknowledges that Pascal's apologia 
for Christianity was not directed at Everyperson to accept a God-in-general, but rather a rational 
case for nominal Christians of "slack religiosity" seduced by this-worldly interests and concerns to 
return to the Christian fold. Pascal's project of practical reasoning in theology has a specific audience 
in mind, namely, the Christian who is acculturated, yet straying into the free-thinking libertin of his 
social circle. 
The major problem of Pascal's project—and Rescher's treatment of it— is that it assumes 
that an evidential mode of reasoning leaves the case of God's existence "up in the air." I do not 
believe that a persuasive rational case can be made against the existence of God, but given the 
perennial problem of evil in theology I hold that evidential modes of rationality yield conclusions 
against the probability of God's existence. The seminal thought of Kant and the radical formulations 
of Kierkegaard, James, and Barth acknowledge that God-talk hits up against the evidential modes of 
rationality in our culture. In this sense, a rational though practical case for God's existence is more a 
defense of a particular religious tradition than an attempt to conceive of another mode of rationality. 
Rescher's rejection of the exorbitant claims of James reveals his own preference for Kant as the 
legitimate heir of Pascal's basic shift. And I believe he is right. Yet, this simply shows the degree to 
which both Pascal and Kant refuse to realize just how non-rational (not irrational) God-talk is in a 
culture permeated by evidential modes of rationality. To call such non-rational talk a mode of 
practical reasoning should not conceal just how such talk is against the modern grain. 
